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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public school funding has been contentiously litigated throughout 
the United States, and the Washington Supreme Court has addressed the 
inadequacy of public school funding in two pivotal cases: Seattle School 
District No. 1 v. State1 and McCleary v. State.2 In both decisions, the 
Washington Supreme Court held that the State failed to provide an ade-
quate basic education for its public school students;3 however, in its at-
tempt to remedy the situation, the court took drastically different ap-
proaches. 
In McCleary v. State, the focus of this Comment, the Washington 
Supreme Court held that the State had not met its constitutional obliga-
tion to adequately fund K–12 education, and the court ordered the legis-
lature to fully fund the State’s basic education program by 2018.4 Inter-
estingly, the court also retained jurisdiction over the case, and ordered 
the legislature to report annually to the court so that it could evaluate 
whether the legislature was making meaningful progress towards the 
court’s mandate.5 This jurisdictional retention initially caused some strife 
among the justices, with several denouncing the judiciary’s oversight of 
the legislature as a violation of the separation of powers.6 This Comment 
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 1. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
 2. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012). 
 3. See id. at 258; Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94–95. See also infra Part II. 
 4. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 231. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 6. See infra Part II.C.2. Chief Justice Madsen originally opposed the court’s retention of juris-
diction over the McCleary case, and Justice James Johnson authored several dissenting opinions to 
orders issued by the majority following the McCleary decision. See infra Parts II.B–C. However, 
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argues that this alleged infringement by the court is not a violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine—at least not in Washington State. This 
Comment further delineates what steps the Washington Supreme Court 
may take before blatantly overstepping its constitutionally delineated 
bounds. 
Part II of this Comment provides a detailed summary of two key 
Washington cases pertaining to public school funding: Seattle School 
District No. 1 v. State and McCleary v. State. Following the decision in 
McCleary, the Washington Supreme Court issued five orders related to 
the legislature’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the State’s constitu-
tional mandate.7 These orders, and the subsequent judicial–legislative 
tug-of-war, are important not just because of their holdings, but also be-
cause of the long-standing debate between the court and the legislature as 
to the proper role of the judiciary in the educational finance arena. 
Part III analyzes the separation of powers debate generated by the 
McCleary court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the case. It ultimate-
ly concludes that the court’s direct oversight of the legislature is not a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine, but is in line with the 
court’s jurisprudence. The court’s actions are well within its judicial au-
thority because Washington employs a functional separation of powers 
doctrine that permits greater flexibility and communication between the 
branches of government.8 For sociopolitical issues of great importance—
such as public school funding adequacy—public policy justifies the use 
of this flexible approach. 
Part IV discusses the court’s response to the legislature’s noncom-
pliance. Although the McCleary holding does not run afoul of the separa-
tion of powers, the court’s enforcement of its mandate could potentially 
violate the separation of powers doctrine. Part V concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Washington State Constitution asserts that “[i]t is the para-
mount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education9 of all 
children residing within its borders.”10 Therefore, the State has a judicial-
                                                                                                                                     
Justice Johnson is no longer a Washington Supreme Court justice, and the recent contempt order was 
unanimously decided. 
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
 8. See infra Part III.B. 
 9. The trial court declined to address definitively the terms “ample,” “provision,” and “educa-
tion,” opting instead to utilize these words “as guidelines for giving the Legislature the greatest 
possible latitude to participate in the full implementation of the constitutional mandate.” Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 93 (Wash. 1978). 
 10. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
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ly enforceable and affirmative duty to provide for the education of all K–
12 public school students.11 Because the constitution asserts that this duty 
is “paramount,”12 the obligation to adequately provide for Washington 
schoolchildren is accorded an elevated status.13 Examination of the 
Washington State Constitution reveals that the framers specified only 
one state function as a paramount duty within the entire document—the 
State’s duty to provide for the education of its resident children.14 Evi-
dently, the Washington Constitutional Convention placed great emphasis 
on the education of children residing within the state’s borders.15 The 
following cases illustrate how the court has interpreted this paramount 
duty.  
A. Seattle School District No. 1 v. State 
In Seattle School District No. 1 v. State, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that the legislature failed to meet its constitutional obligation 
to adequately fund public schools.16 Prior to the decision, public schools 
in Seattle were forced to rely on special levy elections to supplement 
school funding because the legislature did not appropriate sufficient rev-
enue to fund annual educational programs.17 This reliance on special levy 
elections created a precarious financial situation for public schools. Alt-
hough school districts could receive additional funding through levy 
elections, “voters [were] not required to approve the request.”18 Addi-
tionally, special excess levy elections could only be brought twice annu-
ally; upon failure of the second election, the school district was forced to 
operate with the inadequate funds provided by the legislature.19 In 1975, 
after two failed special excess levy proposals, parents of children en-
rolled in the Seattle School District brought a civil suit alleging that the 
State had failed to uphold its constitutional obligation to provide for the 
education of its resident schoolchildren.20 
                                                            
 11. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85. 
 12. Id. “‘Paramount’ is not a mere synonym of ‘important.’ Rather, it means superior in rank, 
above all others, chief, preeminent, supreme, and in fact dominant.” Id. at 91. 
 13. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash. 2012). 
 14. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85. 
 15. See id. at 91 (“Theodore L. Stiles, a member of the 1889 constitutional convention wrote: 
‘No other state has placed the common school on so high a pedestal. . . . But the convention was 
familiar with the history of school funds in the older states, and the attempt was made to avoid the 
possibility of repeating the tale of dissipation and utter loss.’”). 
 16. See id. at 99. 
 17. Id. at 77–78. 
 18. Id. at 78. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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The court found that during the 1975–1976 academic year, 40% of 
students in Washington attended “levy loss districts.”21 The lack of fund-
ing forced levy loss districts to reduce teaching staff, subject offerings, 
and security personnel.22 Additionally, these districts had to cut the 
budget for fundamental teaching supplies—including textbooks.23 This 
financial uncertainty created a gradual decline in public school efficacy; 
as one scholar noted, a “pattern of boom and bust economic swings cre-
ates havoc with educational opportunity.”24  
Furthermore, the court found evidence that suggested this levy sys-
tem was patently prejudicial to children in low socioeconomic communi-
ties because special excess levies depend on the assessed property valua-
tions within a particular district.25 Presumably, urban communities with 
higher property valuation were more likely to raise sufficient funds 
through special excess levies than rural communities with lower property 
valuation.26 The court thus held that the State’s duty to make ample pro-
vision for the education of resident children was not constitutionally sat-
isfied by the authorization of special excess levy requests.27 The legisla-
ture must make sufficient provision for basic education through appro-
priation or “dependable and regular tax source[s].”28 The court held that 
special excess levy funds were neither. 
Next, the court determined that it was the judiciary’s duty “to con-
strue and interpret the word ‘education’ by providing broad constitution-
al guidelines”; however, it was the legislature’s duty “to give specific 
substantive content to the word [education] and to the program it deems 
necessary to provide that ‘education’ within the broad guidelines.”29 
Therefore, the court mandated that the legislature define “basic educa-
tion”30 and fund Washington’s basic education program—without the use 
                                                            
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 98. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic Education in Times of Fiscal 
Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1861 (2012). 
 25. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 98–99. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 99. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 95. 
 30. Id. The State had not previously defined basic education; therefore, the trial court relied on 
three ad hoc definitions of basic education, ultimately concluding that state funding was insufficient 
to satisfy any one of the three proposed definitions. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash. 
2012) (discussing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 71). The Washington Supreme Court did 
provide a broad guideline of what constituted education, stating that education “must prepare our 
children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that sys-
tem’s survival. It must prepare them to exercise their First Amendment freedoms both as sources and 
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of special excess levies31—no later than July 1, 1981.32 The court, how-
ever, did not direct the legislature as to how it should accomplish these 
directives, stating, “While the Legislature must act pursuant to the con-
stitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the general authority to select 
the means of discharging that duty should be left to the Legislature.”33 
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s 
decision to retain jurisdiction, finding it “inconsistent with the assump-
tion that the Legislature will comply with the judgment and its constitu-
tional duties.”34 The court stated that it had “every confidence [that] the 
Legislature will comply fully with the duty mandated by [the constitu-
tion].”35 Despite the court’s confidence in the legislature’s efforts, thirty 
years after Seattle School District No. 1, the Washington Supreme Court 
once again held that the State had failed to adequately fund basic educa-
tion.36 After a second failure, however, the court was unwilling to place 
its blind faith in the legislature once again. 
B. McCleary v. State 
In McCleary v. State, parents of schoolchildren in the Seattle 
School District again challenged the adequacy of public school fund-
ing.37 The Washington Supreme Court found that after Seattle School 
District No. 1 was decided, the legislature had defined basic education as 
mandated.38 However, the funding allocated by the legislature did not 
correlate with the actual cost of providing students with the “education” 
advanced by the legislature.39 Consequently, during the thirty-some years 
following Seattle School District No. 1, Washington school districts in-
                                                                                                                                     
receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to 
gain maturity and understanding.” Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 94 (citations omitted). 
 31. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 98–99. Although the court held that schools must not 
be forced to rely on levies in order to fund basic education, the court expressly indicated that levies 
might be brought to fund enrichment programs that go beyond basic education. Id. 
 32. Id. at 105. 
 33. Id. at 96. 
 34. Id. at 105. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 261 (Wash. 2012). 
 37. Id. at 230. 
 38. ESHB 2261 redefined basic education by outlining educational standards in terms of: (1) an 
instructional program of basic education, (2) an institutional program for detained juveniles, and (3) 
student transportation, in addition to providing instruction regarding standardized testing, highly 
capable programs, remediation, transitional bilingual education, and special education programs. See 
id. at 241–42. Furthermore, ESHB 2261 added voluntary full-day kindergarten to the basic education 
program. Id. 
 39. Id. at 253–54. 
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creasingly relied on levies to supplement state funding40—an eerily rem-
iniscent cycle.  
In McCleary, the State argued that the basic education program was 
fully funded according to the Basic Education Act, which stated that 
“education shall be considered to be fully funded by those amounts of 
dollars appropriated by the legislature.”41 As the court noted, however, 
this provision essentially “allow[ed] the State to maintain the appear-
ance” of a fully funded basic education program, when in actuality the 
program was grossly underfunded.42 Levy funds were once again used to 
support basic education in an attempt to “fill the gap” between state ap-
propriations and the actual cost of providing basic education.43 In a stern 
pronouncement, the court reiterated that “[r]eliance on levy funding to 
finance basic education was unconstitutional 30 years ago in Seattle 
School District, and it is unconstitutional now.”44 The court held once 
again that the State could not rely on local excess levies or federal fund-
ing to meet its constitutional obligation to provide ample provision for 
the education of schoolchildren.45 
After McCleary was filed in the trial court, the State initiated a 
comprehensive review of K–12 funding, and before trial was concluded, 
the legislature passed ESHB 2261.46 ESHB 2261 defines the resources 
and offerings that the legislature believes are necessary to give all stu-
dents the opportunity to meet state educational standards.47 The legisla-
ture intended to fully implement the reforms in ESHB 2261 no later than 
2018.48 However, the legislature failed to adequately fund ESHB 2261.49 
Although substantial evidence showed that state allocations had fallen 
short of the actual cost of implementing the basic education program,50 
the court was encouraged by the intent of ESHB 2261, stating that it was 
a “promising reform program.”51 
The court noted that because the duty to provide ample education 
for public school students was imposed upon the State, as opposed to the 
                                                            
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 254. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 258. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 257–58, 261. 
 46. Id. at 241. 
 47. Id. at 241–43. 
 48. Id. at 243. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 260. 
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legislature only,52 the constitution expressly contemplated shared powers 
among the three coordinate branches in deciding public education mat-
ters.53 However, although the legislative, executive, and judicial branches 
share the responsibility to provide an ample education for resident stu-
dents, the judiciary alone is responsible for interpreting constitutional 
provisions, as it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”54 This is true “even when that inter-
pretation serves as a check on the activities of another branch or is con-
trary to the view of the constitution taken by another branch.”55 
Additionally, the court observed that article IX, section 1 of the 
Washington State Constitution confers on resident schoolchildren a “pos-
itive constitutional right to an amply funded education.”56 A positive 
constitutional right is realized only when the government acts, as op-
posed to a negative constitutional right, “which can only be realized in 
the absence of governmental interference.”57 Thus, analysis of a negative 
constitutional right asks whether the legislature or executive has “over-
stepped its authority under the constitution,” whereas analysis of a posi-
tive constitutional right asks “whether the State has done enough.”58 Fur-
thermore, positive constitutional rights are those that “the State cannot 
‘invade[] or impair[],’” as opposed to negative constitutional rights, 
which can be impaired “upon showing a compelling state interest.”59 
In the past, positive constitutional rights were often deemed unen-
forceable, nonjusticiable political questions, and judicial enforcement of 
these rights would usually constitute a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine.60 However, state courts have increasingly regarded the-
                                                            
 52. “It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all chil-
dren residing within its borders . . . .” WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 53. See McCleary, 269 P.3d at 246–47. 
 54. Id. at 246 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 83 (Wash. 1978) (lan-
guage originally from Marbury v. Madison)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Id. (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 83) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 56. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 231. 
 57. Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive Rights Claims: 
The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1057, 1057 n.2 (1993) 
(emphasis added) (citing Susan F. Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contri-
butions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights 
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 734–43 (1981)). An example of a negative right would be the right 
to free speech, while a positive right would be the right to income. Id. at 1072. See also Burt 
Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 
881, 883 n.12 (1989). 
 58. Feldman, supra note 57, at 1058–59. 
 59. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248 (quoting Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 92 n.13).  
 60. Feldman, supra note 57, at 1058–59. 
1444 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 38:1437 
se positive constitutional rights as capable of judicial interpretation.61 In 
McCleary, the court found that the positive constitutional right to an ade-
quate education is capable of judicial interpretation and that “federal lim-
its on judicial review . . . are inappropriate.”62 Based on these considera-
tions, a majority of the court determined that it was necessary to retain 
jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the State fulfilled its paramount 
duty to provide for the education of all Washington public school stu-
dents.63 The majority emphasized that by retaining jurisdiction, an ap-
propriate balance between the judicial and legislative functions could be 
obtained. As such, the court rightly deferred the means for implementing 
the State’s constitutional requirements under article IX, section 1 to the 
legislature, while ensuring that the court was able to directly monitor 
proposed remedies.64 
Although the court expressed some hesitation in its decision to re-
tain jurisdiction, it was ultimately unwilling to risk another thirty-year 
cycle of failed basic education programs. It stated, “This court cannot 
idly stand by as the legislature makes unfulfilled promises for reform.”65 
The court recognized the troubling economic situation faced by the State 
(and the nation as a whole) and determined that it did not want to take a 
wait-and-see approach to the legislative reforms passed while McCleary 
was awaiting appeal.66 The court also emphasized the positive aspects of 
retaining jurisdiction, namely promoting cooperation between the 
branches of government and fostering dialogue throughout the imple-
mentation of necessary reforms.67 While recognizing the complexity of 
the forthcoming issues, the court refused to “throw up its hands and offer 
no remedy at all.”68 Therefore, the court held: 
The State has failed to meet its duty under article IX, section 1 by 
consistently providing school districts with a level of resources that 
falls short of the actual costs of the basic education program. The 
legislature recently enacted sweeping reforms to remedy the defi-
ciencies in the funding system, and it is currently making progress 
toward phasing in those reforms. We defer to the legislature’s cho-
sen means of discharging its article IX, section 1 duty, but the judi-
                                                            
 61. Id. 
 62. McCleary, 269 P.3d at 248. 
 63. Id. at 231. 
 64. Id. at 261. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 260. 
 67. Id. at 261. 
 68. Id. 
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ciary will retain jurisdiction over the case to help ensure progress in 
the State’s plan to fully implement education reforms by 2018.69 
Not all of the justices approved of the majority’s decision to retain 
jurisdiction. Chief Justice Madsen agreed that the State had failed to 
meet its duty to adequately fund basic education under the Washington 
State Constitution, but she maintained that the legislature was responsi-
ble for implementing the court’s mandate.70 As a result, it was the court’s 
duty to exercise judicial restraint.71 
Chief Justice Madsen argued that the precedent set in Seattle School 
District No. 1 supported judicial restraint because the court had previous-
ly deferred to the legislature on how to implement the law regarding pub-
lic school funding.72 Additionally, the adoption of specific standards and 
guidelines for state funding, including funding for basic education, had 
historically been a job for the legislative branch, not the judiciary.73 Fi-
nally, Chief Justice Madsen reiterated that the legislature had recently 
enacted what the majority itself considered “promising reform.” Conse-
quently, she contended that the judiciary should exercise restraint and 
permit the legislature to implement the statutory reforms set forth in 
ESHB 2261, without scrutinizing every minute step.74 
C. The Aftermath of the McCleary Decision: Reports by the Joint Select 
Committee 
The court retained jurisdiction over the McCleary case and estab-
lished a protocol requiring the legislature to report directly to the court 
by filing periodic reports—through the Legislative Joint Select Commit-
tee on Article IX Litigation75—at the conclusion of each legislative ses-
sion from 2013 through 2018.76 These reports allow the court to both 
                                                            
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 262 (Madsen, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 263. 
 74. Id. 
 75. In order to respond to the court’s request, a bipartisan coalition of legislative leaders intro-
duced House Concurrent Resolution 4410, which established the Joint Select Committee on Article 
IX Litigation. One of the purposes of the committee is to “provide a point of contact for the Legisla-
ture to communicate with the Court . . . .” JOINT SELECT COMM. ON ARTICLE IX LITIG., REPORT TO 
THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 4 (2013), available at http://leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees 
/AIXLJSC/Documents/ArticleIX2013Report-ReceivedByCourt.pdf. 
 76. Order of July 18, 2012 at 2, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [here-
inafter McCleary Order of July 18, 2012], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public 
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actively monitor the legislature’s implementation of the reforms set out 
in ESHB 2261 and evaluate whether the legislature’s actions “show real 
and measureable progress toward achieving full compliance with article 
IX, section I by 2018.”77 The plaintiffs are also provided an opportunity 
to file written comments addressing—and criticizing—the legislature’s 
self-reported implementation of reforms and progress.78 The court does 
not measure the legislature’s actions against full constitutional compli-
ance with the McCleary holding; rather, the State is required to “demon-
strate steady progress according to the schedule anticipated by the en-
actment of the . . . reforms in ESHB 2261.”79 
1. Washington Supreme Court Order of December 20, 2012 
The State filed its first mandated report by the Joint Select Commit-
tee on Article IX Litigation on September 17, 2012.80 In response, the 
court filed an order on December 20, 2012, holding that the legislature 
had failed to meet the articulable standards required by the McCleary 
decision.81 In a scathing opinion, the court noted that the committee had 
done little more than summarize the court’s holding in McCleary: the 
committee’s report provided no indication of how the legislature intend-
ed to comply with the court’s mandate.82 The court also noted that since 
the passage of ESHB 2261 in 2009, significant cuts had been made to 
education funding throughout Washington—some of which had been 
partially restored but were still below the level that the court held to be 
“constitutionally inadequate” in McCleary.83 
The court was unsatisfied with the legislature’s efforts overall and 
emphasized that “[s]teady progress requires forward movement. Slowing 
the pace of funding cuts is necessary, but it does not equate to forward 
                                                                                                                                     
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/mcclearyOrder.pdf  (determining that the reports must be filed 
after “each legislative session from 2013 through 2018, within 60 days after the final biennial or 
supplemental operating budget is signed by the governor”). 
 77. Id. at 3. 
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. at 3. 
 80. See generally JOINT SELECT COMM. ON ARTICLE IX LITIG., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON 
STATE SUPREME COURT (2012) [hereinafter JOINT SELECT COMM., 2012 REPORT], available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/mcclearyStateFiling.p
df. 
 81. Order of Dec. 20, 2012 at 1, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [here-
inafter McCleary Order of Dec. 20, 2012], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public 
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20-%20McCleary,%20et%20al.%20v.%20State 
%2012-20-12%20order%20with%20dissent.pdf. 
 82. See id. at 1–2. 
 83. Id. at 2. 
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progress; constitutional compliance will never be achieved by making 
modest funding restorations to spending cuts.”84 However, the court reit-
erated, “It continues to be the court’s intention to foster cooperation and 
defer to the legislature’s chosen plan to achieve constitutional compli-
ance. But, there must in fact be a plan.”85 Implicit in this statement was 
the court’s thinly veiled threat of court-imposed sanctions if the legisla-
ture was unable or unwilling to comply with the judicial mandate. The 
court ordered the legislature to submit a report at the end of the 2013 leg-
islative session setting forth the legislature’s plan—in sufficient detail to 
allow progress to be measured in all areas of education identified in 
ESHB 2261—in accordance with the mandate to fully fund basic educa-
tion by the year 2018.86 
Justice James M. Johnson dissented in the order, asserting that the 
court violated the separation of powers doctrine.87 According to Justice 
Johnson, the legislature is solely responsible for educational funding be-
cause, under the Washington State Constitution, “[t]he legislature shall 
provide for a general and uniform system of public schools.”88 Therefore, 
by regulating the proposed assessments and rejections of the legislature’s 
plan to fully fund basic education, the court has, in Justice Johnson’s 
opinion, dictated the precise means by which the legislature must act—a 
violation of the separation of powers.89 Justice Johnson also noted that 
the courts are generally unsuited to remedy policy judgments like those 
confronted in McCleary, and as such, the court should presume that the 
legislature will continue to act in good faith while implementing the edu-
cational reforms set forth in ESHB 2261.90 
2. Washington Supreme Court Order of January 9, 2014 
Following the State’s second report to the Washington Supreme 
Court by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation, the court 
held that the State had taken “meaningful steps” towards amply funding 
basic education.91 According to the State’s calculations, a total of $982 
                                                            
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 86. Id. at 2–3. 
 87. Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012 at 1, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 
84362-7) [hereinafter Dissent to Order of Dec. 20, 2012], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20-%20McCleary,%20et%20al.% 
20v.%20State%2012-20-12%20order%20with%20dissent.pdf. 
 88. Id. at 5 (alteration in original) (citing WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2). 
 89. Id. at 4–5. 
 90. Id. at 5–6. 
 91. Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 2–3, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [here-
inafter McCleary Order of Jan. 9, 2014], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/ 
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million was allocated to K–12 basic education for the 2013–2015 bienni-
um.92 This translated into a 6.7% increase over the prior “constitutionally 
inadequate” level of funding.93 The court held that the increased operat-
ing budget was “undeniably an improvement” and that “implementing 
education reform has become a higher priority for the State, as even a 
casual observer of the 2013 legislative session could not fail to appreci-
ate.”94 
However, the court also found that these improvements were not 
sufficient to conclude that the State had made adequate progress towards 
achieving full constitutional compliance.95 Consequently, the court de-
termined that although the “State’s Report demonstrates that it under-
stands what progress looks like, and . . . it has taken some steps toward 
fulfilling its constitutional mandate[,]”96 the State was still not on target 
to satisfy its constitutional obligations by 2018.97 
Once again, the court ordered the legislature to submit a complete 
plan for fully implementing its basic education program, this time by 
April 30, 2014.98 The plan was required to include a “phase-in schedule” 
for full funding of all components of basic education set forth in ESHB 
2261.99 Although this imposed an additional obligation upon the legisla-
ture, the court noted: 
The need for immediate action could not be more apparent. Con-
versely, failing to act would send a strong message about the State’s 
good faith commitment toward fulfilling its constitutional promise. 
This court also made a promise to the school children of Washing-
ton: We will not “idly stand by as the legislature makes unfulfilled 
promises for reform.” Our decision in this case remains fully subject 
to judicial enforcement.100 
Justice Johnson again dissented, vehemently opposing the “impro-
priety—indeed unconstitutionality—of the court’s expanding exercise of 
                                                                                                                                     
publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/20140109_843627_McClearyOrder.pdf (“[U]nlike in 
2012, meaningful steps were taken in the 2013 legislative session to address the constitutional im-
perative of amply providing for basic education.”). 
 92. Id. at 2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 3. 
 95. See id. at 6–7. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 8. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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continuing jurisdiction . . . .”101 He further asserted that even if the legis-
lature was in violation of the constitution, the judiciary simply does not 
possess an adequate enforcement mechanism to compel the legislature to 
act.102 Justice Johnson noted, 
Because we would be fashioning a tool that has not been constitu-
tionally delegated to us, we are left with far too many unanswered 
questions concerning this makeshift authority. It is unclear if we 
should hold specific legislators in contempt or the legislative body 
as a whole. . . . Because the body of legislators changes over time, 
and indeed has changed since the first opinion, it is uncertain which 
legislators and which time frame should be held accountable. 
. . . . 
. . . . We are not—and should not be acting as—managers of the 
state coffers.103 
Justice Johnson concluded, “These uncertainties undoubtedly indicate 
that we are in territory far unsuitable for the judicial hand as defined in 
our constitution . . . .”104 
3. Washington Supreme Court Order to Show Cause Dated  
June 12, 2014 
The Joint Select Committee filed its supplementary report by the 
deadline mandated.105 In the court’s response, dated June 12, 2014, it 
aptly noted that although the legislature “relates what the State urges to 
be significant progress,” the report “candidly admits that ‘[t]he Legisla-
ture did not enact additional timelines in 2014 to implement the program 
of basic education as directed by the Court . . . .’”106 Further, the legisla-
ture admitted that “there was no political agreement reached either 
among the political caucuses or between the legislative chambers on 
                                                            
 101. Dissent to Order of Jan. 9, 2014 at 1, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 
84362-7), available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20 
News/20140113_843627_McClearyDissentToOrder.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. Id. at 6, 8. 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. See generally JOINT SELECT COMM. ON ARTICLE IX LITIG., REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON 
STATE SUPREME COURT (2014) [hereinafter JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT], available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20-
%20Third%20report%20adopted%20by%20Comm.pdf. 
 106. Order to Show Cause at 2, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [here-
inafter McCleary Order to Show Cause], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public 
Upload/supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ShowCauseOrder_201406124.pdf (quot-
ing JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT, supra note 105, at 27). 
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what the full implementation plan should look like . . . .”107 The legisla-
ture also offered no evidence to suggest that there would be an agreement 
on implementation at the next legislative session.108 Despite these fail-
ures, the Joint Select Committee’s report asked the court to acknowledge 
that 2015 was the “most critical” year for the legislature in its effort to 
meet the judicial mandate and develop a plan to implement a fully fund-
ed basic education program.109 In effect, the legislature asked for more 
time despite the fact that 2018 is rapidly approaching and a plan to fully 
fund education has not yet been established. As a result, the court issued 
an order directing the State to show cause as to why it should not be held 
in contempt for violating the January 2014 order, and why, if found in 
contempt, sanctions or other relief should not be granted.110 
4. Washington Supreme Court Order in Response to  
September 3, 2014, Show Cause Hearing 
On September 11, 2014, following the show cause hearing a week 
earlier, the court unanimously held the State in contempt for failure to 
submit “a complete plan for fully implementing its program of basic ed-
ucation for each school year between now and the 2017–2018 school 
year.”111 Although the State admitted that it did not comply with the 
court’s January 2014 order, it urged the court to give the legislature one 
more opportunity to develop and enact a plan to fully fund K–12 public 
education by 2018.112 
Although the court found the legislature in contempt, it also held 
“[s]anctions and other remedial measures . . . in abeyance to allow the 
State the opportunity to comply with the court’s order during the 2015 
legislative session.”113 The court stated that “[i]f by adjournment of the 
2015 legislative session the State has not purged the contempt by com-
                                                            
 107. JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT, supra note 105, at 27. The short 60-day session 
ended without lawmakers coming to an agreement on a plan. John Higgins, Court Hears Arguments 
in McCleary School-Funding Case; Watch Coverage Replay, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014, 5:00 
AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/educationlab/2014/09/02/historic-mccleary-school-funding-
hearing-coming-wednesday/. 
 108. McCleary Order to Show Cause, supra note 106, at 3. 
 109. JOINT SELECT COMM., 2014 REPORT, supra note 105, at 33. 
 110. McCleary Order to Show Cause, supra note 106, at 3–4. 
 111. Order of Sept. 11, 2014 at 4, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (No. 84362-7) [here-
inafter McCleary Order of Sept. 11, 2014], available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Public 
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf. Pursuant to the 
January 9, 2014, order, the State was required to include a “phase-in schedule for fully funding each 
of the components of basic education.” McCleary Order of Jan. 9, 2014, supra note 91, at 8. 
 112. McCleary Order of Sept. 11, 2014, supra note 111, at 2. 
 113. Id. at 4–5. 
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plying with the court’s order, the court will reconvene to impose sanc-
tions and other remedial measures as necessary.”114 Additionally, the 
court provided that should the legislature fail to comply with the court’s 
order by the adjournment of the 2015 session, the State must file “a 
memorandum explaining why sanctions or other remedial measures 
should not be imposed.”115 Thus, the court has given the legislature yet 
another attempt to fund Washington public schools with yet another op-
portunity to explain if it again fails. 
III. CRITIQUE 
School funding litigation often blurs the traditional roles of the ju-
dicial and legislative branches because “[l]itigation over educational ad-
equacy . . . places the judiciary in the position of rendering value judg-
ments as to legislative appropriation levels . . . and this requirement rais-
es significant separation of powers concerns.”116 This blurred line be-
tween the judicial and legislative functions of state governments raises 
concerns that courts are determining issues based on policy considera-
tions more appropriately within the confines of the legislature—not the 
judiciary.117 
A. Nationwide Public School Funding Litigation 
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that education is not a 
fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution,118 the ultimate forum for 
challenging a state’s educational program is the state’s highest court.119 
Therefore, “state courts provide the only judicial recourse for plaintiffs 
seeking . . . adequate funding for public education.”120 As of December 
2014, only five states had avoided litigation challenging the constitution-
                                                            
 114. Id. at 5. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational 
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 704 (2010). 
 117. See id. at 705–06. 
 118. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). The United States 
Supreme Court found that education was not among the basic fundamental rights protected under the 
Constitution either explicitly or implicitly, and thus was not subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 
37–39. Because education “presents a myriad of ‘intractable economic, social, and even philosophi-
cal problems[,]’” the Court felt that the imposition of “inflexible constitutional restraints” would 
inhibit the ability of state legislatures to respond to complex problems confronted in educational 
reform. Id. at 42–43 (citation omitted). 
 119. See Rebell, supra note 24, at 1865. 
 120. Justin Abbasi, Adequate Education in Washington State: Money, Rights, and Power 3 
(Dec. 29, 2014) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). 
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ality of public school funding,121 and educational adequacy litigation was 
pending in eleven states.122 From 1989 to 2014, courts in twenty-two 
states issued decisions either affirming or enforcing the rights of students 
to an adequate basic education, while fourteen state courts awarded state 
defendant victories.123 Most of the state courts that returned verdicts in 
favor of state defendants did so on the ground that public school funding 
is a legislative concern and is nonjusticiable.124 
Although the early 1990s saw an overwhelming amount of school 
funding litigation, courts have recently rejected such litigation in an at-
tempt to broaden the demarcation between the judiciary and the legisla-
ture.125 Between 1989 and 2005, school funding litigation plaintiffs won 
more than 75% of cases; however, in recent years, the scale has tipped 
heavily towards legislative deference (ultimately amounting to a victory 
for the state defendant).126 For example, 
[S]ince 2005, adequacy plaintiffs [have] struggled to surmount the 
courts’ unease with adjudicating these cases. Plaintiffs’ adequacy 
claims were dismissed before ever reaching trial in nine of the nine-
teen decisions handed down between 2005 and 2008. By contrast, 
only five courts had refused to hear adequacy claims in the preced-
ing sixteen years.127 
   
                                                            
 121. NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, LITIGATIONS CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
K-12 FUNDING IN THE 50 STATES (2014), available at ahttp://schoolfunding.info/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Litigations-Challenging-Constitutionality-of-K-12-Funding10.pdf. The five 
states that have never had a constitutional challenge to K–12 funding are Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Nevada, and Utah. Id. 
 122. Education Adequacy Liability Decisions Since 1989, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK 
(2014), http://schoolfunding.info/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/School-Funding-Adequacy-Decisions 
-by-Outcome-.pdf. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Bauries, supra note 116, at 746. Before the merits of the plaintiff’s case can be heard 
by the court, the plaintiff must first survive a motion to dismiss by the defendant that school funding 
is a legislative function and is thus nonjusticiable; the plaintiff must effectively argue that the state’s 
constitution provides individuals the right to “adjudicate educational adequacy.” Vinay Harpalani, 
Note, Maintaining Educational Adequacy in Times of Recession: Judicial Review of State Education 
Budget Cuts, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 259–60 (2010). 
 125. See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in 
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 
84 (2010). 
 126. Id. at 85. 
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cond, under a functional approach to the separation of powers doctrine—
as opposed to a traditional, formal separation of powers doctrine—state 
judiciaries possess great flexibility when reviewing the actions of coor-
dinate branches of government.130 
In Seattle School District No. 1, the court summarily dismissed the 
argument that adequacy school funding claims were nonjusticiable.131 
The court held that because article IX, section 1 of the constitution re-
quired interpretation before the extent of the State’s duty to provide for 
the education of its resident students could be determined, there was no 
separation of powers issue.132 Additionally, although the court has previ-
ously articulated a justiciability test, it has not hesitated to disregard this 
test when confronted with an issue of “great public interest.”133 Finally, 
the Washington Supreme Court utilizes an expansive exception to moot-
ness, which permits cases of “continuing and substantial public interest” 
to be brought even if the court cannot provide the relief sought by the 
party or even provide effective relief of a general nature.134 Therefore, 
although McCleary would likely have been rejected by a federal court as 
a nonjusticiable political question, the Washington Supreme Court elect-
ed to hear the case because it presented an ongoing issue of public im-
portance. 
Further, in Washington, courts have the “sole and final say in inter-
preting the Constitution on behalf of all three branches of govern-
ment . . . .”135 Although the court unquestionably held that it was well 
within its judicial authority to interpret the constitutional provisions at 
issue in McCleary, it attempted to placate the legislature by acknowledg-
ing that the determination of whether an action of the executive or legis-
lative branch exceeds its authority is “a delicate exercise in constitutional 
interpretation . . . .”136 The court also noted that each branch of govern-
ment is required to “take . . . account” of the other branches’ powers; no 
branch of government is “intended to operate with absolute independ-
ence.”137 Obviously, the extent to which each branch of government 
                                                                                                                                     
analysis and criticism by scholars, jurists, and others for almost two hundred years.” H.R. 2060, 55th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (Wash. 1997). 
 130. See Feldman, supra note 57, at 1087–88. 
 131. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 80–84 (Wash. 1978). 
 132. Id. at 88–89. 
 133. See Philip A. Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in Gen-
eral Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 717–18 (1999). 
 134. Id. at 719. 
 135. Id. at 702. 
 136. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 84. 
 137. Id. at 88. 
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played an equal role in the determination of the McCleary case is subject 
to debate. 
Finally, a more flexible approach to the separation of powers doc-
trine, commonly called a “functional approach,” is utilized in Washing-
ton.138 There is no formal separation of powers provision in the Washing-
ton Constitution, and the courts have traditionally viewed the separation 
of powers doctrine as “grounded in flexibility and practicality” without 
broad demarcation “beyond which one branch may not tread.”139 The 
lack of a formal doctrine does not mean that there is no division between 
the three branches of government; rather, “one branch will violate [the] 
separation of powers if its activity ‘threatens the independence or integri-
ty or invades the prerogatives of another’” branch.140 
By contrast, the formal separation of powers doctrine emphasizes 
sharp division between the three branches of government and reinforces 
the view that each branch should be free from the influence of the oth-
ers.141 Under this approach, the powers and functions of the different 
branches of government are not flexible, but rigid, and do not shift in 
response to historical and political concerns and conditions.142 
In McCleary, the court has seemingly adopted a functional ap-
proach.143 A functional view of the separation of powers doctrine “em-
phasizes efficiency of function rather than strict separation.”144 This ap-
proach provides for more flexible judicial review than the formal separa-
tion of powers doctrine.145 According to some, this approach is also more 
likely to result in higher standards of judicial review.146 As an illustra-
tion: 
The functional approach aims to allocate the tasks of government to 
those organs most likely to perform them well and recognizes that 
the allocation of power between branches of government must re-
main somewhat fluid in order to respond to changing political con-
ditions. Rather than creating bright lines between the workings of 
the different branches of government, a functional view of separa-
tion of powers stress[es] the ambiguities of the distribution powers 
                                                            
 138. Talmadge, supra note 133, at 712. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Abbasi, supra note 120, at 14 (quoting Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash. 1975)). 
 141. See Harpalani, supra note 124, at 264. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Abbasi, supra note 120, at 15 (functionalist approach evidenced by the court’s retention of 
jurisdiction and requirement of yearly updates by the legislature). 
 144. Harpalani, supra note 124, at 264. 
 145. Id. at 261. 
 146. Id. at 266. 
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and embrace[s] flexible principles governing what authority each 
branch of government can properly exercise.147 
State constitutions often provide for direct judicial review of the 
legislature; thus, the judiciary frequently plays a heightened role in state 
governments.148 Additionally, institutional concerns that support more 
formal separation of powers are often not present in the state context, as 
state courts are more likely to have direct political accountability due to 
the election of state judges.149 Finally, state governments are often inher-
ently flexible due to the broad plenary power possessed by state legisla-
tures, as opposed to the federal legislative branch, whose powers are spe-
cifically enumerated in the U.S. Constitution.150 
Although a functional approach to the separation of powers pro-
vides more flexibility than a formal approach, there are still clearly de-
marcated lines that the judiciary may not cross. For example, the “deter-
mination of specific remedies and the allocation of funds . . . [are] legis-
lative or executive functions.”151 However, the court has the capacity to 
determine whether these specific remedies or allocations are constitu-
tional.152 Thus, although the judiciary is the ultimate interpreter of the 
constitution and is responsible for setting constitutional standards, it is 
unable to implement potentially effective remedies or allocate requisite 
funds because these are traditionally legislative duties.153 In public school 
funding cases, this creates a cycle within which the same (or substantial-
ly similar) claims are repeatedly brought before the judiciary: the judici-
ary declares the legislature’s remedial action unconstitutional, and the 
legislature attempts to design an appropriate remedy, which the court 
subsequently declares unconstitutional as well.154 This oscillation be-
tween the legislature and the judiciary––in which the legislature enforces 
a remedy in response to a judicial mandate and the court then holds the 
remedy unconstitutional, requiring the legislature to return to the drawing 
board—often results in expensive and protracted litigation where no ef-
fective remedy is implemented and the state’s educational system ulti-
mately remains broken.155 
                                                            
 147. Id. at 264–65 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148. Feldman, supra note 57, at 1066–67. 
 149. Harpalani, supra note 124, at 266–67. 
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 151. Id. at 260–61. 
 152. See id. at 261. 
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2015] Public School Funding and McCleary v. State of Washington 1457 
By retaining jurisdiction and requiring that the legislature report di-
rectly to the court, the State and the court are able to maintain an open 
dialogue about the constitutionality of the legislature’s proposed reme-
dies without resorting to continuous litigation. The court’s functional 
approach to the separation of powers permits the judicial, legislative, and 
executive branches to engage in a system of allocation that focuses less 
on what specific “roles” each branch should take and instead permits the 
government to work together to achieve a desirable result for the state as 
a whole. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Under a functional separation of powers doctrine, the judiciary has 
the authority to uphold positive constitutional rights and order the legis-
lature’s compliance; however, there are still critical concerns as to how 
the court can remedy the legislature’s noncompliance. One of the most 
problematic aspects of sociopolitical litigation is the inherent difficulty in 
fashioning and enforcing suitable remedies.156 Additionally, the negative 
implications of judicial activism can potentially outweigh the benefits 
sought in public school funding cases, especially where the ultimate 
goals are unattainable.157 
The McCleary court is currently in a difficult position. Ultimately, 
it must wait and see if the legislature will purge the contempt order by 
the adjournment of the 2015 legislative session. If the legislature does 
not move swiftly to purge the contempt order, the legitimacy of all three 
branches of government could be undermined. The court has indicated 
that should the legislature fail to purge the contempt order, it will act 
quickly; if the State fails to agree on a plan by the session’s last day, it 
must provide a written explanation to the court the very next day.158 Of 
course, at this point, the judiciary will have to enforce a remedy. Howev-
er, what is an appropriate remedy? 
Plaintiffs in the McCleary case have proposed a number of potential 
remedies including: (1) imposing monetary contempt sanctions against 
legislative branch officials; (2) prohibiting government expenditures on 
matters unrelated to public school funding until the State complies with 
the court’s constitutional ruling; (3) ordering the legislature to pass legis-
lation funding specific amounts; (4) prohibiting the State from limiting 
educational programs to less than all eligible students in a given grade 
                                                            
 156. See Talmadge, supra note 133, at 698. 
 157. For example, the ultimate goal of an “adequate” public school education may be unattain-
able if the state legislature does not possess funds sufficient to remedy the constitutional violation. 
 158. McCleary Order of Sept. 11, 2014, supra note 111, at 5. 
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level; (5) ordering the sale of state property to fund constitutional com-
pliance; and (6) issuing a writ of mandamus to compel performance.159 
State courts that have upheld constitutional challenges to adequate 
public school funding have faced difficulty in their attempts to enforce a 
feasible remedy. For example, in DeRolph v. State,160 the Ohio Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff school districts three times, holding 
that Ohio had failed to provide a “thorough and efficient” system of edu-
cation in violation of the state constitution.161 However, the court did not 
impose consequences when the legislature repeatedly failed to sufficient-
ly increase education funding.162 In December 2002, the court decided 
that it would no longer retain jurisdiction.163 
Other state courts have threatened injunction in order to coerce leg-
islative compliance with educational funding mandates. Illustratively, in 
Robinson v. Cahill,164 the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an injunc-
tion prohibiting officials from spending funds in support of public 
schools until the legislature met its constitutional mandate to provide a 
“thorough and efficient” education for public school students.165 The 
court subsequently ordered the closure of public schools over the sum-
mer after the legislature failed to sufficiently increase educational fund-
ing.166 After an eight-day closure, the legislature adopted a state income 
tax.167 
Similarly, in 2005, the Kansas Supreme Court ordered the legisla-
ture to increase funding for K–12 education, and the court set a deadline 
after which all public schools would be shut down if funding was not 
provided.168 In response, the legislature complied and approved the addi-
                                                            
 159. Plaintiff/Respondents’ 2012 Post-Budget Filing at 42–43, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 
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 160. See generally DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002); DeRolph v. State, 754 
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tional funding before the court’s deadline.169 Unfortunately, these 
measures appear to have been only temporary solutions, as both Kansas 
and New Jersey have faced subsequent educational funding litigation.170 
Similar to the approach taken in New Jersey and Kansas, the 
McCleary plaintiffs suggested that Washington public schools be shut 
down until the legislature complies with the court’s mandate. Closing all 
public schools until the legislature appropriates additional funding is a 
risky venture that “assumes no education is preferable to the education 
students . . . are currently receiving.”171 In New Jersey, public schools 
were only closed for a short period before the legislature responded, and 
in Kansas schools were never closed. However, if the court ordered pub-
lic schools in Washington to close and the legislature did not increase 
funding, “it is [the] schoolchildren who [would be] harmed most direct-
ly.”172 
The efficacy and constitutionality of several remedies proposed by 
the plaintiffs in McCleary are debatable. First, courts have traditionally 
hesitated to impose, or even threaten to impose, budgetary allocations.173 
This is understandable considering that legislatures have traditionally had 
exclusive control over appropriations and budgetary allocations.174 This 
is true in Washington; the Washington State Constitution “places the au-
thority for appropriation of funds exclusively in the legislature.”175 
Thus, ordering the legislature to pass legislation funding specific 
amounts would likely infringe on the legislature’s plenary power of taxa-
tion and violate the separation of powers. Directing the legislature to 
fund specific amounts for education could also “upset the ‘appropriate 
balance’ between deference to the Legislature ‘to determine the precise 
means for discharging its article IX, section 1 duty.’”176 In both Seattle 
School District No. 1 and McCleary, the court explicitly deferred to the 
legislature in determining the means by which the legislature would 
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 170. See id.; New Jersey, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, http://www.schoolfunding.info/ 
states/nj/lit_nj.php3 (last updated Mar. 2011). 
 171. State of Washington’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 28, McCleary v. 
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 172. Id. at 29. 
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comply with the court’s mandate.177 It is inadvisable for the court to 
abandon this principle of legislative deference at this stage in the litiga-
tion. Similarly, the diversion of existing funds to public school education 
would necessitate the redirection of funds from other programs. This 
would likely come at the expense of higher education, human services, or 
both.178 The court has said “[it] would hardly relish being the cause of 
distress to people in need or students in [the state’s] universities and col-
leges.”179 
Second, in response to the plaintiffs’ suggestion that the court order 
the sale of state property, the State noted that the plaintiffs offered no 
examples of any state property that could be sold.180 Further, the sale of 
state property would hardly be considered a “‘dependable and regular’ 
revenue source” from which to fund basic education.181 
Third, the imposition of monetary sanctions on individual legisla-
tors could potentially be more harmful than helpful because sanctions 
could logistically “coerce[] the vote of legislators.”182 Furthermore, a fine 
imposed on the State is theoretically more harmful to schoolchildren than 
the original suit is beneficial because it would diminish the “funds avail-
able to finance compliance with the Court’s remedial order.”183 
Finally, although the court does have the authority to issue writs of 
mandamus, the writ is not frequently used to control the legislature and is 
justified only as an extraordinary remedy.184 Additionally, “writs of 
mandamus must be directed at an ‘inferior tribunal, corporation, board or 
person.’ The legislature is separate and equal, not inferior to the 
Court.”185 Thus, it seems that all of the plaintiffs’ proposed remedies are 
insufficient and unlikely to bring about a fully funded public education 
system in Washington. 
In short, Washington is in uncharted territory. The Washington Su-
preme Court has never before held the legislature in contempt for failure 
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to obey a court order.186 Many legislators are dissatisfied, to say the least, 
with the recent contempt order.187 Consequently, the legislature could 
strike back at the court. The legislature could reduce the size of the su-
preme court, fail to fund judicial services, or propose a constitutional 
amendment “to give the Legislature the exclusive authority to define the 
courts’ jurisdiction or remedial authority.”188 Furthermore, if the court 
does overstep its bounds, it is unlikely the McCleary case will be appeal-
able to the U.S. Supreme Court.189 At that point, the governor of Wash-
ington will have to either enforce or abstain from enforcing the court’s 
order.190 
Although the court unquestionably has the authority to enforce its 
own contempt orders “through its inherent, and broad, contempt pow-
ers,”191 if the court imposes sanctions against the legislature for failure to 
purge the contempt order, it will be difficult to avoid overstepping tradi-
tional, judicial bounds. However, although the judiciary arguably risks 
damage to its “impartial” reputation by engaging in “judicial activism,” 
there is little the court can do after it has ordered the legislature to com-
ply with a judicial mandate.192 Even scholars who maintain that judicial 
involvement in sociopolitical controversies is unwarranted often concede 
that once the judiciary has inserted itself into the controversy, and is sub-
sequently faced with noncompliance on the part of the legislature, there 
is often no alternative but for the judiciary to subsequently “act as a leg-
islative body” in fashioning a remedy.193 Ultimately, the citizens of 
Washington will determine which governmental branches, if any, acted 
outside their constitutional authority.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In McCleary, the Washington judiciary embraced an active role in 
the determination of educational funding adequacy. The court deter-
mined that the best method to guarantee legislative compliance was to 
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retain jurisdiction over the matter—enabling the judicial and legislative 
branches to engage in open communication while ensuring that the judi-
cial mandate is met. Although the courts do not frequently retain jurisdic-
tion over cases, this procedure does not violate the separation of powers 
doctrine in Washington because Washington has historically utilized a 
functional approach to the separation of powers. However, the court is in 
a perilous predicament because it has very few practical enforcement 
methods that may be employed in the event the legislature fails to com-
ply with the court’s ultimate mandate. If the legislature fails to meet its 
constitutional obligations, it is likely the judiciary will have to violate its 
own constitutional obligations in order to compel the legislature’s com-
pliance—a direct violation of the separation of powers. 
